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2Abstract
This paper uses Brazilian census data to evaluate the correlates, consequences, 
and possible causes of child labor. I find strong evidence that although most working 
children are also attending school, they are falling well behind their peers.  I then attempt 
to explain state-by-state variation in child labor participation rates by using state level 
data, finding that economic concentration in specific industries is correlated with higher 
child participation in the labor market. Finally, using census data on income, I show that 
the current Brazilian program to alleviate child labor may also be effective in targeting 
higher income households then those now eligible for the program.
I. Introduction
Talk of child labor in the developing world typically evokes images of hapless 
children sweating their futures away in cramped factories, while greedy owners and 
managers become rich on their backs. This image has led many to call for legislation that 
bans child labor, or in developed nations, one hears the call to ban imports from countries 
that employ child labor in production.1 Before racing to any action one must critically 
evaluate child labor, understanding why it occurs and what, if any, means should be taken 
to alleviate it.
Estimates of the worldwide incidence of child labor are dependent on how you 
define a child and how you define labor. The International Labor Organization’s (ILO) 
convention No. 138 states that anyone 15 and older should, under normal circumstances, 
1
 See “The Child Labor Deterrence Act” introduced by senator Tom Harkin
3be allowed to work (ILO, 1996)2. Using this definition of a child and considering a 
laborer anyone who participates in full or part time work, the ILO estimates that world 
wide more than 260 million children are working. That figure is fully one sixth of the 
world’s children. If you redefine laborer to include only those children who are involved 
in full time labor, that figure drops substantially to around 78.5 million (Grootaert, Kanbu 
1995, p. 189). In Brazil, while the incidence of child labor is declining it remains large, 
especially in light of relatively high income per capita (Ferreira, Lanjouw, and Neri, 
2002, p. 1).
3
High child labor participation rates should concern us for several reasons. First, 
children are exposed to hazardous conditions on the job. Regardless of industry 
employed, child laborers are more vulnerable than adults to direct physical harm and are 
more susceptible to cumulative hazards such as chemical or radiation exposure (ILO 
2
 Taken From Basu 1999
3
 Table taken from Basu 1999, it is based on IADB figures
Table 1:
Child Labor Participation Rates for Children, 10-14 Years
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995
W orld 27.57 24.81 22.3 19.91 14.65 13.02
Africa 38.42 35.88 33.05 30.97 27.87 26.23
Latin America 19.36 16.53 14.6 12.64 11.23 9.77
 & Caribbean
Asia 36.06 32.26 28.35 23.42 15.19 12.77
Europe 6.49 3.52 1.62 0.42 0.1 0.06
Ethiopia 52.95 50.75 48.51 46.32 43.47 42.3
Brazil 23.52 22.19 20.33 19.02 17.78 16.09
China 47.85 43.17 39.03 30.48 15.24 11.55
India 35.43 30.07 25.46 21.44 16.68 14.37
Italy 29.11 10.91 4.12 1.55 0.43 0.38
Source: ILO (1996a).
4Website, 1999).  Second, it is a stylized fact that child laborers achieve lower education 
levels and have lower future earnings potential than their nonworking counterparts 
(Emerson Souza, 2003, p. 376). It is because of these two pernicious effects that 
stemming the tide of child labor has found a legitimate place at the forefront of the global 
political consciousness.
Many of the world’s governments, including Brazil’s, have made the reduction of 
child labor participation rates a priority. Through legislation and regulation, governments 
are attempting to influence families to keep their children out of the labor force, but are 
they using the right means? This paper will describe child labor in Brazil, and present an 
overview and evaluation of the methods used by the Brazilian government to fight it. The 
findings will be presented as follows; a summary of the data used in the study will be 
presented in section II. Section III will develop the model used for exploring child labor. 
Section IV will outline summary statistics for Brazil. Section V will present an overview 
of Brazil’s efforts to curtail child labor. Section VI will present regression results, and 
section VII will summarize the paper and present some possible policy implications of 
the empirical findings. 
II. The Data
The data set used in this paper is the main Brazilian household survey for 2001, 
the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostragem a Domicilio (PNAD), which I obtained from the 
Brazilian Census Bureau (IBGE). The PNAD is an annual panel survey that does not 
track participants through time, similar to the Current Population Survey in the U.S. On a 
household level, the data contains information on family size, composition, income, and 
5region of residence. The survey also contains personal information on age, education, 
gender, race, and position of the individual in the household (mother, father, child etc.). 
Although the survey is nation wide, there is a paucity of data for northeast rural regions 
of the country due to government budget constraints. Although 2002 PNAD data was the 
most recent available, 2001 was chosen because it contained additional information about 
the work of children from ages 5-17. 
The 2001 survey contains data on 378,837 individuals. As the focus of this paper 
is on child labor, I restricted the data set to those individuals between the ages of 4 and 
16. As outlined above, the ILO defines a child laborer as being under the age of 15 who is 
in the workforce. My inclusion of 15 and 16 year old children is consistent with the 
stance of the Brazilian government which has legislation prohibiting a child from 
entering the work force before the age of 17 (world bank 2001, p. xi). I then eliminated 
observations that had no data on family income levels, or family composition, as these 
became essential elements in my analysis. These restrictions left me with a sample of 
84,987 children, 42,231 females and 42,756 males from 26 states of Brazil and the 
Federal District.4,5 
While defining what constitutes a child only required selecting an age bracket, 
defining what constituted a laborer was a more intricate task. In regards to work outside 
the home, the data showed some inconsistency. Some respondents answered yes to the 
question “have you worked in the past week?” while answering no to the question of 
4 The Federal District is a rectangular area in the middle of the state of Goiás where the Federal 
Government is established. According to the Constitution, the Federal District cannot be divided in 
municipalities, like all other states; instead, the F.D. is divided in so called Administrative Regions, the 
most important of which is Brasília. However, unlike the United States, the Federal District contains 
regions apart from the capital, including Taguatinga, and Guara. (http://www.v-brazil.com)
5
 The use of other variables, such as school attendance rates, in some analyses reduces the data set further.
6“have you worked in the past year?” For consistency, I defined a worker as a child who 
reported working positive labor hours at any time in the past year.6
III. Model of Child Labor
In assessing the causes and correlates of child labor I have chosen to view child 
labor from a perspective common in present research. Child labor is not likely the result 
of cruel parents forcing their children to work so they may have leisure time. On the 
contrary, child labor is more often, as Basu and Van phrased it, “(a) problem of stark 
poverty where the parents are compelled to send the children to work for reasons of 
survival.” (Basu and Van 1998, p. 413) In this view, poverty should be the most 
prominent correlate with child labor. Indeed, when the Brazilian government 
implemented programs to target child labor they did so partly by subsidizing the income 
of the household in hopes of alleviating the need for parents to send their children to 
work. There is also significant evidence to support the assertion that child labor is not a 
result of societal norms. In support of this assertion, Basu and Van note “the children of 
the nonpoor seldom work even in very poor countries” (Basu and Van 1998, p. 415)
As my allusions to their work indicate, I base my evaluation of child labor in 
Brazil on the model forwarded by Basu and Van in their seminal work, “The Economics 
of Child Labor.” Their model is founded on two basic assumptions. The first, termed the 
Luxury Axiom supposes that “A family will send the children to the labor market only if 
the family’s income level from non-child- labor sources drops very low” (Basu and Van 
1998, p. 421). Their second assumption, which deals with a firm’s ability to substitute 
6
 Much of the analyses outlined later in the paper were also run using “worked in week” as the dependent 
variable. This yielded similar quantitative results. The results of these regressions are available upon 
request. 
7between child and adult labor, is not relevant to my research. Although the Luxury Axiom 
is not infallible, (We will see evidence from Brazil that some of the children from 
wealthier families are still in the labor market), the basic concept that families would like 
to withdraw their children from the labor market if economically feasible appears to be 
supported by the data.
Applying this model to the PNAD data set is problematic. When Basu and Van 
speak of income in their Luxury Axiom they are not referring to absolute income per se, 
but rather to the level of consumption that income permits. In Brazil, a diverse country 
with large cost of living variances, a given income level does not permit identical 
consumption across the country. Thus, a homogenous price assumption is inadequate. 
Unfortunately the PNAD survey only collects data on income, and the Brazilian Census 
Bureau does not collect annual data on regional price indexes. To cope with the issue I 
used the guidelines set forth by Ferreira Lanjouw and Neri (Ferreira Lanjouw and Neri, p. 
2003).7 Using data from Brazil’s other population survey, the PPV, the authors construct 
poverty lines, and price indices based on probable consumption patterns rather than 
merely income data.8 The price lines they set out are used by the authors to construct a 
poverty profile for Brazil. In my research, The price lines are used to deflate income data 
across the regions of Brazil to account for cost of living variation. 
7
 For Details on income deflators used, see Ferreira Lanjouw and Neri, in “A Robust Poverty Profile for 
Brazil Using Multiple Data Sources.” (2003).
8
 The PPV investigates both income and consumption patterns of individuals, this allowed Ferreira 
Lanjouw and Neri to generate real income levels that were in line with consumption. Unfortunately the 
PPV was last undertaken in 1996 and the IBGE has not conducted a more recent consumption based 
survey. This makes the price lines used in this analysis somewhat out of date, but still superior to a 
homogenous price assumption.
8 IV. Summary Statistics
Using the definitions of child and laborer outlined above the following statistics 
were derived from the model. According to the data, 11.7% of the children in Brazil are 
currently engaged in the labor market. However, there is a wide degree of disparity 
between males and females and urban and rural residents. 8.39% of female children in 
Brazil are actively involved in the labor market, compared with 15.09% of male children. 
In urban areas of Brazil only 8.57% of the children are working compared with 27.59% 
in rural areas. Also, the sexual disparity increases as you move from urban to rural areas. 
In urban areas the male child participation rate is only 3.88 percentage points higher than 
that of females, while in rural areas the difference climbs to 22.26 (Table 2).
The disparity between male and female work may largely be explained by higher 
involvement in domestic tasks on the part of females. Females in the data spent an 
average of 14.45 hours per week on domestic tasks while males spent only 8.87 hours. 
Across the population females spent more time on domestic tasks than males. In urban 
areas child laborers regardless of sex spent more time working domestically than their 
nonworking counterparts, while in rural areas this trend was reversed. In general the 
Table 2: 
Child labor Rates: Males v Females Rural v Urban
All Children Aged 4-16
Male Child Female Child Both Sexes
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Child Labor
Yes
Count 3729 2642 2346 1243 6075 3885
% 10.51% 39.19% 6.62% 16.93% 8.57% 27.59%
No
Count 31761 4099 33069 6098 64830 10197
% 89.49% 60.81% 93.38% 83.07% 91.43% 72.41%
9pattern of domestic work across sexes and in rural vs. urban areas varied greatly, the 
results are summarized below in Table 3. 
Despite the higher labor participation rates of males than females one should 
pause before concluding that child labor is a more pressing concern in the male 
population. According to the ILO, girls are more likely than boys “to be working in 
industries which are hidden and unregulated,” which leaves them “more vulnerable to 
exploitation and abuse.” (ILO website, 1999) It is therefore likely that female child labor 
is underreported compared to that of males, and possibly more hazardous. 
As mentioned above, child labor is a concern in more than the short term. 
Children who work are less likely to attend school, this lowers their future earnings 
potential and lowers the human capital accumulation of the nation as a whole (World 
Bank, 2001. p. V). This assertion appears contradicted by a fairly high rate of school 
attendance even among Brazilian child laborers. In Brazil 83.89% child laborers attend 
school, compared with 90.27% of children in general and 92.10% of children who don’t 
work. Males are more likely than females to attend school regardless of their child labor 
Table 3: 
Child Labor Rates: Males Females and Domestic Work
All Children Aged 4-16
Male Child Female Child Both Sexes
Hrs/Wk domestic Hrs/Wk domestic Hrs/Wk domestic
Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural
Child Labor
Yes
Count 3729 2642 2346 1243 6075 3885
Hrs/Wk dom 9.41 8.91 16.42 15.76 12.12 11.10
No
Count 31761 4624 33069 5573 64830 10197
Hrs/Wk dom 8.68 9.58 14.10 14.96 11.44 12.52
Total
Count 35490 7266 35415 6816 70905 14082
Hrs/Wk dom 8.79 9.26 14.32 15.15 11.55 12.11
Note: Hours per week are only domestic labor
10
status. This may be caused by societal norms, or the increased domestic responsibilities 
of females as was shown in Table 3. Table 4 summarizes the school attendance status of 
both working and non-working children.
9
The detrimental effects of child labor on school achievement are not limited to 
lower attendance rates. Children who work and attend school are falling behind their 
peers at an alarming rate. Literacy rates for working children are below the national 
average. Although both workers and non-workers have literacy rates in the high 90s by 
the time they reach the age of 16, child laborers achieve literacy much later in life, which 
stunts their total educational achievement (Chart 1).10
9
 A Similar table using 1998 PNAD data appears in Emerson and Souza 2002.
10
 The argument that child laborers gain knowledge of the World of Work which offsets any educational 
loss has not held up to empirical research. (Baland, Robinson 2000, 667)
Table 4: 
Child Labor Rates: School Attendance Male v Femals 
All Children Aged 7-16
Male Child Female Child Both Sexes
Attends School Attends School Attends School
No Yes No Yes No Yes
Child Labor
Yes
Count 966 5351 617 2950 1583 8301
Row % 15.29% 84.71% 17.30% 82.70% 16.02% 83.98%
No
Count 1145 28028 1542 30171 2687 31316
Row % 3.92% 96.08% 4.86% 95.14% 7.90% 92.10%
Total
Count 2111 33379 2159 33121 4270 39617
Row % 5.95% 94.05% 6.12% 93.88% 9.73% 90.27%
11
By the age of eight, 83% of non working children can read, compared to 65% of 
working children, this disparity decreases with age. In light of the similar school 
attendance rates, this result is somewhat surprising. The cause for the differing literacy 
rates is likely the result of later school enrollment by laborers and lower achievement 
while in school. Although the majority or child laborers are still attending school, any 
time spent working means less time available to concentrate on school. If this is the case 
then workers should not only be falling behind their peers in terms of literacy, but in 
other measures of scholastic achievement as well. To test this, a grade-lag variable was 
created that measure how far each child in the data was falling behind.11
The PNAD data contains information on what grade the child is currently 
attending. In Brazil, it is common practice that a child begins school at the age of seven. 
Therefore, a seven year old should, assuming he/she is not falling behind, report being in 
11 This measure of school lag is consistent with the work of the World Bank when they studied the impact 
of child labor on school attainment (World Bank, 2001). 
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Literacy Achievement: Laborers v Non Laborers
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grade 1, an eight year should be in grade 2 and so on. The grade-lag variable is equal to 
(Age – 6 – Grade). Because this is not an attempt to measure whether or not children are 
attending school, but rather how they are doing in their studies, only students who 
currently reported attending school are included in the data. It should also be noted that 
students born later in the year will have grade-lags biased upwards (World Bank, 2001 p. 
15). However, because both groups in this comparison, workers and non-workers, 
experience this bias, the impact on the analysis should be negated. 
As can be seen in Chart 2, the difference in grade-lag between working and non-
working students increases steadily until it reaches its pinnacle around age 12 or 13 when 
students should be in the fifth or sixth grade. After this point the grade-lags converge, and 
non-working students actually have a higher grade-lag than child laborers for 15 and 16 
Chart 2:
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year olds. This is likely due to the fact that working students have a higher attrition rate 
and are more likely to drop out of school. 15 to 16 may be the age when they chose to 
leave. In general, the data reflect the expected trend in grade-lag with child laborers 
falling farther behind their non-working peers. It should also be noted that this trend 
reverses itself in rural communities, where child non-laborers have slightly larger grade-
lags before age 11, but significantly smaller grade-lags in the following years (Appendix 
Chart A). 12 Also, grade-lags of workers vary greatly across the states of Brazil, ranging 
from an average difference across all years of 2.86 in the state of Amapá, to an average 
difference of .56 in the State of Acre (Appendix Table B).
The World Bank believed that a major cause of this grade-lag is late enrollment 
into school by young working children. Using 1999 data they observed that in rural areas, 
Brazilian working children enroll four months later than those who do not work, in urban 
areas the difference is only three months (World bank, 2001, p. 16). In my data, relatively 
few of the child laborers are as young as 7 years old, so it seems odd that late enrollment 
would be driving the grade-lag. However, more important than the current age of the 
child laborer is the age in which they entered the labor market. This is a likely a better 
measure of the cumulative impact of child labor.
PNAD 2001 provides data on what age each child began working. This data was 
sorted by the age a child began working, and then a running sum of the percentage of 
child laborers entering the workforce was calculated. From this it can be seen that of 
working children, 12% entered the work force before the age of 8, while 22% entered 
12
 World Bank, 2001, also observed this phenomena using 1999 PNAD data and attributed it to “supply-
side differences: rural schools may be providing substandard services relative to urban schools.” As well as 
“demand-side effects: rural households are more likely to be poorer and less likely to be able to afford 
keeping the child in school or to be able to afford sending them to better schools.” However, this 
explanation seems inadequate and the phenomenon deserves further inquiry.
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before the age of 9. More than half of all working children in the data entered the 
workforce before the age of 12. Chart 3 below summarizes the results.
Labor Participation rates vary a great deal across Brazil. By sorting the data by 
state and by region it can be seen that there is a large degree of variation in child labor 
participation rates across states and regions. The rates range from a high of almost 15% in 
the Northeast region of the country to a low of a little over 8.5% in the Southeast. Chart 4 
below illustrates the regional variation.
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There is also a large degree of variation amongst states within these regions 
(Appendix Chart C).  The largest incidence of child labor occurs in the northeast state of 
Piauí, with a child labor rate of 22.74%. Yet within that region, the state of Sergipe has a 
child labor rate of only 11.33%. A large degree of this variation can be accounted for by 
the rural/urban distribution of the sample within the state. States with larger rural 
populations are likely to have a higher child labor participation rates. However, even 
when controlling for this we still observe a large degree of variation in child labor rates 
across states (Appendix Chart D). As will be seen in the empirical section, much of the 
variation across these states may be correlated with the state level economic 
concentration in certain industries. 
The impact of household income on decision to send a child into the labor market 
is of primary concern to this study. As was outlined in section III it is believed that poor 
families put their children into the work force out of desperation, not out of neglect or 
Chart 4:
Child Labor Partcipation Rates by Region
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abuse. We would therefore expect that families with lower real incomes would have 
higher rates of child labor, and indeed the data support this (Chart 5).
As can be seen in Chart 5, poor families are not only putting their children to 
work at a higher rate than the rich, but also at a younger age. Because the negative impact 
of child abuse is cumulative, the younger the age entering the labor market, the more 
pernicious is child labor. Therefore, although the labor participation rates of the wealthy 
are non-negligible, they are not as concerning as child labor in poor families.
As expected, the income generated by these child laborers is a significant 
percentage of family income in poor households. For the bottom two income deciles child 
laborers’ income is 45% that of total household income, excluding children. This is 
consistent with the theory of Basu and Van and indicates that the families of the poor rely 
Chart 5
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heavily on the income generated by their children. Table 5 below summarizes child 
laborers’ contribution to household income.
Although, the contribution to family income in percentage terms by the children 
of the rich is less than by the children of the poor, their absolute income levels are much 
higher. Even controlling for age, the children of rich households have significantly higher 
income levels than those of poor households. This may be the result of nepotism by rich 
families, or better education and thus higher earning potential of rich children (Appendix 
Chart E).
V. Brazil’s Efforts to Curtail Child Labor
In 1996, Brazil instituted a child labor reduction program entitled Programa de 
Erradicacao do Trabalho Infantil (PETI). The program consisted of two separate fronts. 
Table 5:
Percentage of Monthly Family Income Provided by Children
By Income Decile
Decile
Total Family 
Income (R)
Child Laborers' 
Income(R)
Total Family 
Income (USD)
Child Laborers' 
Income (USD)
% Family 
Income
1 R83.26 R63.62 $35.37 $27.02 76%
2 R191.28 R59.25 $81.25 $25.17 31%
3 R271.60 R64.81 $115.37 $27.53 24%
4 R358.45 R83.02 $152.26 $35.27 23%
5 R448.49 R88.61 $190.50 $37.64 20%
6 R565.10 R104.82 $240.03 $44.52 19%
7 R722.52 R118.69 $306.90 $50.42 16%
8 R956.07 R144.87 $406.10 $61.54 15%
9 R1,426.06 R157.34 $605.74 $66.83 11%
10 R3,929.63 R210.87 $1,669.17 $89.57 5%
Notes: Conversion based on 2001 average USD/Real exchange rate
Family income is exclusive of child laborers' contribution
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The first component consisted of an income subsidy provided to low-income households. 
The second was a required amount of school attendance. To qualify for this subsidy 
households had to fulfill the following requirements.
• Have per capita income below one-half the minimum wage (roughly equal to 
R150, $65/month). 
• Households were required to sign a contract agreeing to the following
o Their child would not work. 
o The child would attend school at least 80% of the time. 
o The child would attend after-school sessions called the Jornada Ampliada 
which roughly doubled the length of the school day. (Ferreira, Lanjouw, 
and Neri, 2002, p. 4)
The program originated in the northeast state of Pernambuco and was later 
expanded to include the states of Bahia and Sergipe, also in the northeast. The program 
was instituted in these regions because of the high rates of child participation in the 
harvest and refinement of sisal (agave), which is considered extremely hazardous. 
(Ferreira, Lanjouw, and Neri, 2002, p. 5). The level of the income subsidy was dependent 
on the state of residence and the amount of children a household enrolled in the PETI 
program. In all three states half of the transfer went to cover the cost of the after-school 
session and half was given directly to the household. In Bahia and Sergipe the transfer 
amount was R25/month per child, while in Pernambuco the transfer was $50/month for 1 
or 2 participating children, $100/month for 3 or 4 children, and $150/month for 5 or 
more. The way the subsidy was structured in Pernambuco was obviously problematic, as 
parents had no incentive to enroll a second, fourth or sixth child in the program. In 
response to this problem, a common benefit criterion was set for all states from 2001 
onwards. Families now receive a subsidy for each participating child (World Bank, 2001, 
p. viii).
19
The program has, by in large, been a great success.13 It has both decreased child 
labor participation and increased school attendance by the target population. The only 
negative consequence has been increased labor participation, in terms of hours worked, 
by those children who do not participate in the program. This has been largely attributed 
to supply and demand effects. The decrease in the child labor supply increased wages, as 
a consequence, those children still in the labor are working more (Ferreira, Lanjouw, Neri 
2002, p. 18).
VI(a). Basic Regression Results14,15
In building a model to explain child labor and Brazil, I began with the basic 
correlations that could be predicted from the summary statistics. As expected the 
coefficients on male, age, and number of children in the family are all positive and 
significant at 99%. The positive and significant coefficient on the “number of children in 
the family” variable indicates that the more children in the family, the more likely an 
individual is to work. This is likely the effect of spreading a set family income level 
across more children. The coefficients on income is negative while income squared is 
positive, indicating that higher income levels decrease your chance of working, but at a 
decreasing rate CP. However the magnitude of the income-squared dummy is so small it 
can almost be ignored. The dummy coefficient for urban children is negative and 
significant while the coefficient on the dummy variable for white children is negative, but 
13
 See both World bank, IADB
14
 All models were run with logistic regression, predicting the probability of a child working. Models were 
also run using probit regressions, yielding quantitatively similar results. Those outputs are available upon 
request. 
15
 Positive coefficients indicate higher probability of a 1 value for the 1,0 variable Laborer
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not significant.16 Surprisingly the coefficient for two parent households is not significant. 
Indicating that having the father in the household does not decrease a child’s chance of 
working. The relationship between the presence of a father in the household and family 
income may explain the insignificance of this variable. The coefficient for “does not 
attend school is positive” as expected, indicating that children attending school are less 
likely to work. However this variable was removed in later regressions because of strong 
endogenous variable concerns. There was also a variable for whether the child in question 
is not the offspring of the family head, but rather another relative, this was not significant 
at any level and was removed.
The model also ran fixed effects across the states. The zero level dummy was the 
state of Minas Gerais. This was chosen because its child labor participation rate (11.69%) 
was closest to the national average (11.7%). In comparison to this base state, children in 
the states of Amapá in the North and Rio de Janeiro in the Central-West region had the 
lowest probability of working, while children in the Northeast states of Piauí and 
Maranhão had the highest chance of working. Table 6 summarizes the regression results.
16
 In later models the urban dummy will be replaced by a area coding dummy that picks up more 
information about the population size and density households’ location
21
In order to account for the significant differences in child labor probabilities 
across states, state dummies were replaced with state level economic data from 2001. The 
data contains state level employment statistics across all sectors of the economy.17 The 
hypothesis is that certain industries can better use small bodies and small hands and thus 
have higher demand for child laborers. This would increase the demand for child labor in 
certain states, increasing the wage and increasing the amount of children willing to work. 
Appendix Table F summarizes economic concentration by state. On average, the state 
economies of Brazil are concentrated in services and retail, heavy industrial activity, and 
public security and defense, with the highest concentration in public defense.
17
 The variables are entered into the model as percentage of total employment. That is, (Total Employment 
in Agriculture in State A)/(Total Employment in State A)
Table 6:
Regression With State Fixed effects
Coeff. Pr>Chisq State Fixed Effects Coeff. Pr>Chisq
Intercept -7.3961 <.0001 Sergipe 0.5883 <.0001
Male 0.8004 <.0001 Bahia 0.5627 <.0001
Real Income -0.0002 <.0001 Espírito Santo 0.4426 <.0001
Real Income^2 1.87E-09 <.0001 Rio de Janeiro 0.4358 <.0001
Age 0.5201 <.0001 São Paulo 0.3547 <.0001
Age^2 -0.00338 3.66E-02 Paraná 0.3451 <.0001
Urban -1.5175 <.0001 Santa Catarina 0.2702 <.0001
Both Parents in Household -0.012 0.7067 Rio Grande do Sul 0.2591 <.0001
# Children in Household 0.1144 <.0001 Mato Grosso do Sul -0.2311 <.0001
White -0.0441 0.1209 Mato Grosso -0.4847 <.0001
Goiás -0.8042 <.0001
Distrito Federal -0.9174 <.0001
Rondônia 0.2867 0.0002
Acre 0.4444 0.0004
Amazonas 0.2633 0.002
Roraima -0.938 0.0039
Pará 0.2166 0.0145
Amapá -0.4729 0.0239
Tocantins -0.1878 0.0409
Maranhão -0.1242 0.1148
Obs =  83360   Piauí -0.1394 0.1495
Max-rescaled R^2    0.3544 Ceará -0.0639 0.1959
Rio Grande do Norte -0.1464 0.2085
Paraíba -0.0729 0.2292
Pernambuco 0.0711 0.3794
Alagoas -0.0245 0.5564
Note: Bold denotes significance level of or above 95%
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Table 7 above Summarizes where the children in the data set are currently 
working. It’s apparent that the majority of the working children in the data set are 
working in agriculture, 37.15%. This is consistent with other surveys of child labor in 
Brazil (World Bank, 2002) and with child labor globally. Children, though not as capable 
as adults, are able to contribute to agriculture. Therefore it is not surprising that the 
coefficient on agriculture is positive. Indicating that states with higher economic 
concentration in agriculture demand more child labor. Child labor is also highly 
concentrated in service and vendor activities. It is therefore not surprising that the 
regression coefficient “Retail and Service Activities” is also positive and significant. The 
coefficient on telecommunication is predictably negative. Indicating that regions with 
higher employment concentrations in this white-collar industry are less likely to send 
their children into the work force. This is not surprising considering what little worth a 
child would be to a telecommunications firm. The rest of the economic variables in the 
model are harder to explain. There are positive and significant coefficients on both 
education and social services. This may be due to some endogeneity in the model. The 
Table 7:
Child Laborers by Industry
Industry Children
% of Child 
Laborers
Agriculture 3700 37.15%
service 1957 19.65%
Unknown 1654 16.61%
vendor 1389 13.95%
manufacturing 674 6.77%
infrastructure 251 2.52%
finance 115 1.15%
fishing 85 0.85%
professional 81 0.81%
transport 29 0.29%
telecomm 9 0.09%
electrical 7 0.07%
state 6 0.06%
sanitation 3 0.03%
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government may be allocating more social spending to the states with higher rates of 
social ills such as child labor, which would explain this result (Table 8).
In hopes of explaining more about what causes the variation across states in 
Brazil, I added a variable that contained the HIV infection rates from 2001. HIV rates are 
possibly correlated with, public heath and public education among others. The coefficient 
was negative and significant, but with a very small magnitude.  Interestingly, when this 
variable was placed in to the equation the coefficient on state level agricultural 
Table 8:
Regression with State Employment Concentration Percentages
State Econ Percentages With HIV Rates
Coeff. Pr>Chisq Coeff. Pr>Chisq
Intercept -12.6668 <.0001 -12.3041 <.0001
Male 0.7957 <.0001 0.7964 <.0001
Real Income -0.00021 <.0001 -0.00021 <.0001
Real Income^2 1.98E-09 <.0001 1.954E-09 <.0001
Age 0.517 <.0001 0.5168 <.0001
Age^2 -0.00332 0.0395 -0.00332 0.0397
Urban -1.5522 <.0001 -1.5516 <.0001
Both Parents in 
Household
-0.0106 0.739 -0.00996 0.7537
# Children in 
Household
0.1184 <.0001 0.1175 <.0001
White -0.0723 0.0089 -0.0603 0.0317
HIV Rate ******* ******* -0.00616 0.0139
Aggriculture 3.9797 0.0893 1.7795 0.4787
Manufacturing 5.8254 <.0001 5.8863 <.0001
Retail, and Service 
Activities
10.9045 <.0001 10.6206 <.0001
Telecommunications -7.1696 0.0092 -8.2301 0.0031
Public Security and 
Defense
4.6714 <.0001 4.2398 <.0001
Education 7.1298 0.0031 5.5603 0.0264
Other Social Services 11.5746 <.0001 11.6387 <.0001
Obs =  84850   Obs =  84850   
Max-rescaled R^2 = 0.3494 Max-rescaled R^2 = 0.3495
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concentration lost its significance and the coefficient on education loss some magnitude 
and significance. Indicating the possible correlation between these variables, see table 8.
VI (b). Working With the Income Variable
As mentioned above, it is poverty beyond anything else that is the perceived cause 
of child labor. In my analysis, although the coefficient on income exhibits the proper sign 
and is highly significant, the exponential specification does not appear to be properly 
capturing the impact of poverty on child labor. I believed, as Basu and Van did, income 
changes effect child labor participation mainly for low-income households. Once a 
household reaches a certain threshold income level, then further changes should not 
impact child labor. I did not feel that the exponential specification was properly 
accounting for this phenomena.
In order correct for this, and to align the model with the theoretical framework put 
forth by Basu and Van, the specification of income was changed. According to Basu and 
Van’s model, “A family prefers to send the child to work if an only if in the absence of 
income from the child each individual’s consumption falls below a certain exogenously 
fixed subsistence level” (Basu and Van p. 416). In light of this, income should only 
impact the probability of child labor until it permits the subsistence level of consumption. 
After this minimum level is obtained, changes in income should no longer matter for the 
decision to put a child to work. Of course theirs’ is a theoretical framework and will not 
fit perfectly the reality of the situation in Brazil. They assume identical households, and 
one fixed critical level of subsistence consumption across all households; this will not be 
the case in Brazil. Still I believed it was worth the effort to break down the income level 
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and try to find if there exists a critical level of income that has the highest impact on child 
labor. 
Income was broken down into several component levels to try to see where the 
critical level of income falls. First income was broken down into 10 intervals of 100 
Reales  (approx $42.5), and a final interval for anyone with income level greater than 
1000. Each interval was assigned a dummy variable with the final, highest income level 
being the baseline. Next, income was broken down based on deciles of the population in 
the data set. That is, those in the lowest 10% of the population in terms of income 
received a dummy, those in the next 10% received a dummy, and so on. This was done in 
two different ways. First the baseline level was assigned to the top income decile. This 
allowed comparison between every level and the top income decile. Next, the baseline set 
to the top five deciles, allowing comparison between the individual deciles of the bottom 
50% of the population, and the top half. All the results are summarized in Appendix 
Table G.
As might have been predicted, the income breakdowns based on decile showed 
erratic and inconsistent results, this would seem to support Basu and Van’s assertion that 
the critical subsistence level is fixed exogenously and is not dependent on where you fall 
compared to the population, but what level of absolute consumption your income permits. 
The income breakdowns that were based on absolute income levels were much more 
informative. In the breakdown by income levels of R100, only the first three dummies, 
from 0 – 100, 100 –200 and 200 – 300 Reales/month were positive and significantly 
differently from the baseline level of <1000.
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This analysis indicates that the children of the very poor are working at 
significantly higher rates than the children of the rich. However, there is no significant 
difference between the children of the middle-income levels, above 300 Reales/Month, 
and the children of the wealthy. Unfortunately, this does little to indicate where the Basu 
and Van’s critical level of consumption may lie. The analysis only indicates that a change 
from very low levels of income to very high levels, would significantly impact the 
probability that a child would enter the workforce.
 In an attempt to locate the critical value of income that would permit a parent to 
withdraw a child from the labor market, comparisons were made between the probability 
of labor market participation of a child in a given income level, and a child in the income 
level above them. In contrast with the interpretation of a typical dummy variable, which 
only allows for comparisons with the zero valued dummy, this technique permits 
comparisons between any two levels of income. A significant estimate indicates that the 
predicted probability a child from a household in the first income level would enter the 
labor market, is significantly different from the predicted probability of labor force 
participation of a child from the other level in the comparison. 
If we compare each income level with the one directly above it, that is compare 
households with income level less than R100 with income levels R100-R200, then 
compare R100-R200 to R200-R300, and so on, we see each movement up the income 
ladder is significant until you reach the third income tier, that of 200-300 R/Month. There 
is no significant differences, in terms of impact on child labor probability, between 
household in the third and forth tier. The same holds true for all subsequent income tiers. 
See Table 9 for results.
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Attempting to find this critical level of income has more value than simply testing the 
hypothesis of Basu and Van that there exists an exogenously fixed minimum 
consumption level. From a public policy perspective if one could find this critical level, 
then an income transfer program could be designed to target households with the precise 
and effective level of subsidy for maximum impact. However, at this point the results 
from the model appear inadequate to do this and do not point to any specific critical level 
of household income.
In a further attempt to find what level of household income is the critical level, the 
income variable was broken down into income per family member to better align with 
Basu and Van’s theory that it is “each individual’s consumption” level that matters, and 
not the overall wealth of the family. 18 This parceling out of income levels by family 
member does not perfectly account for an individual’s consumption (consider the 
decreasing average cost of shelter for each additional family member) but it may be a 
better approximation of personal consumption than is total family income. After the 
income variable was broken down by number of family members, tiers were assigned at 
18
 The earlier regressions were also run using this parceled out income technique. The results were similar 
with different magnitudes on the income coefficient. These are also available on request.
Table 9:
Comparison Tables:
 Contrast Observations with Consecutive Family Income Levels
Impact on Predicted Probability of Child Labor
Against Income Level Estimate Pr>Chisq
Compare Income Level
<100R 100-200R 1.2732 <.0001
100-200R 200-300R 1.1076 0.0222
200-300R 300-400R 1.0582 0.2523
300-400R 400-500R 1.0147 0.7963
400-500R 500-600R 1.017 0.7891
500-600R 700-800R 0.903 0.1398
700-800R 800-900R 1.1235 0.1382
800-900R 900-1000R 0.8834 0.1564
Note: Bold Denotes Significant Comparison at 90%
28
25R intervals, using dummy variables in the method outlined in the first income 
breakdown.19 Comparisons were made between the adjacent tiers of income, comparing 
the first tier with the second, the second with the third and so on. The data was then 
divided into the five regions of Brazil. This division into regions was an attempt to 
account for any regional differences that the income deflators were not picking up. The 
results are somewhat surprising. 
The data shows that in the northern region of Brazil the income per family member 
comparison is only significant between the fifth and sixth income tiers. Other individual 
level changes were not significant. In the northeast region comparison of the first and 
second tier, seventh and eighth tier, and eighth and ninth tier were significant, while other 
changes were not. In the southern region the only significant comparison was between the 
second and third tiers. The results are summarized in Table 10.20
19
 The smaller interval was an attempt to get a more precise estimate of where the critical value may lie. 
Also, because income was parceled by family member its magnitude has decreased.
20
 Note that because the income level dummies are different both in definition, and in level (R25 compared 
to R100), the results from these regressions will not correspond to the results in the earlier regressions.
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Interpreting these results deserves some care. The observation that there is no 
significant difference between the predicted probability of child labor in the north until 
the firth and sixth income tiers does not imply that a change from the first to the fifth tier 
would have no significant impact on the decision to send a child to work. Rather, the 
results indicate that the most significant impact on probability happens between these two 
levels. In the end, the clearest result from this analysis is that the impact of a change in 
income levels has its most significant impact on the probability of child labor at different 
income levels for the different regions of Brazil.
This same method was then applied to the three states targeted by Brazil’s PETI 
program (Table 11). The most significant comparisons in Pernambuco were between the 
first and second, and second and third tiers. In Bahia, there was a significant difference 
between the first and second tiers, and all tiers above the ninth. In Sergipe the most 
significant comparisons were between the second and third and third and fourth tiers. 
Table 10:
Comparison Tables By Region:
 Contrast Observations with Consecutive Income Per Family Member Levels
Impact on probability of Child Labor
Against Income Level 
Compare Income Level
North Northeast South Southeast Central West
Estimate Pr>Chisq Estimate Pr>Chisq Estimate Pr>Chisq Estimate Pr>Chisq Estimate Pr>Chisq
<25R 25-50R 0.859 0.394 1.286 <.0001 1.215 0.334 1.829 0.000 0.872 0.591
25-50R 50-75R 1.145 0.300 0.997 0.960 1.740 0.000 1.138 0.304 1.064 0.707
50-75R 75-100R 0.979 0.882 1.071 0.327 1.027 0.861 0.844 0.159 1.308 0.094
75-100R 100-125R 1.064 0.697 1.001 0.988 1.148 0.375 1.112 0.386 0.685 0.019
100-125R 125-150R 0.694 0.037 1.022 0.841 0.947 0.733 1.304 0.043 1.134 0.462
125-150R 150-175R 1.134 0.516 0.957 0.725 1.028 0.874 0.703 0.009 0.802 0.233
150-175R 175-200R 1.253 0.320 1.295 0.098 0.771 0.144 1.325 0.060 1.100 0.654
175-200R 200-225R 1.106 0.758 1.578 0.050 1.252 0.275 1.002 0.991 1.072 0.793
200-225R 225-250R 1.442 0.355 0.646 0.106 0.978 0.925 1.023 0.906 1.294 0.429
225-250R 250-275R 0.865 0.737 1.517 0.189 0.880 0.627 1.249 0.273 0.871 0.713
250-275R 275-300R 0.630 0.264 0.783 0.478 1.330 0.288 0.679 0.076 1.583 0.232
Note: Bold Denotes Significant Comparison at 90%
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Because the PETI program bases eligibility on total family income, and not income 
per family member, the income variable was redefined again. Family income, as opposed 
to per family member income, was broken into tiers of R25 and same comparison 
technique was used. It should be noted that this model is also of merit because the 
magnitude of tier spacing, R25, is also the level of income subsidy in both Bahia and 
Sergipe. Therefore, participation in the PETI program would raise family income exactly 
one tier per child participating.21
The results differ from somewhat from those from the prior regressions (Table 
12). In Pernambuco, as was the case using income per family member, comparisons were 
most significant at the lowest levels of income. However, unlike the other result, 
comparisons were significant between households of the sixth and seventh, and seventh 
21
 Also, it should be noted that because of the low-income eligibility requirement, only household in the 
first six tiers of income are eligible for the subsidy.
Table 11:
Comparison Tables By States of the PETI:
 Contrast Observations with Consecutive Income Per Family Member Levels
Impact on probability of Child Labor
Against Income Level
Compare Income Level
Pernambuco Bahia Sergipe
Estimate Pr>Chisq Estimate Pr>Chisq Estimate Pr>Chisq
<25R 25-50R 1.428 0.021 1.295 0.034 1.153 0.690
25-50R 50-75R 1.263 0.109 0.877 0.227 0.583 0.073
50-75R 75-100R 1.030 0.866 1.211 0.154 2.212 0.034
75-100R 100-125R 0.811 0.331 1.085 0.636 1.215 0.697
100-125R 125-150R 1.048 0.865 0.913 0.642 1.188 0.783
125-150R 150-175R 1.000 0.999 1.036 0.877 1.234 0.816
150-175R 175-200R 1.055 0.882 1.675 0.107 0.326 0.233
175-200R 200-225R 1.616 0.392 1.247 0.626 0.224 0.308
200-225R 225-250R 0.724 0.643 0.389 0.038 1.878 0.673
225-250R 250-275R 2.112 0.411 4.862 0.020 0.444 0.569
250-275R 275-300R 0.442 0.359 0.283 0.085 ***** *****
Note: Bold Denotes Significant Comparison at 90%
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and eighth tiers. The results in Bahia showed significant changes between the fifth and 
sixth, eighth and ninth, and surprisingly between the eleventh and twelfth tiers. In 
Sergipe, significant level changes were between the eighth level, and all tested levels 
above. 
The significant impact of income level changes on child labor probability at income 
levels above those eligible for the PETI program is surprising. In Bahia for example, a 
child in the eighth tier has a significantly higher probability of being a child laborer than 
a child in the ninth tier. However, this child would not be eligible for the PETI program 
because the family’s income is above the maximum level of eligibility. As such, it 
appears as though the PETI would be effective in accomplishing its goal of decreased 
child labor even at these higher income levels. Although subsidizing the rich is certainly 
not the goal of the PETI, it should be noted that the minimum wage in Brazil, 
300R/Month, falls at the twelfth and final tier in this analysis. So, although the 
Table 12:
Comparison Tables By States of the PETI:
 Contrast Observations with Consecutive Family Income Levels
Impact on probability of Child Labor
Against Income Level
Compare Income Level
Pernambuco Bahia Sergipe
Estimate Pr>Chisq Estimate Pr>Chisq Estimate Pr>Chisq
<25R 25-50R 1.981 0.501 1.839 0.361 2.362 0.586
25-50R 50-75R 3.494 0.077 0.716 0.385 0.259 0.312
50-75R 75-100R 0.236 0.034 1.785 0.063 0.861 0.875
75-100R 100-125R 0.949 0.876 0.693 0.204 2.131 0.343
100-125R 125-150R 1.039 0.908 2.183 0.007 0.888 0.862
125-150R 150-175R 1.442 0.241 1.076 0.777 2.933 0.117
150-175R 175-200R 1.364 0.274 1.128 0.578 1.203 0.782
175-200R 200-225R 2.292 0.019 0.512 0.012 0.382 0.167
200-225R 225-250R 0.466 0.023 1.505 0.097 9.595 0.007
225-250R 250-275R 1.015 0.957 1.010 0.965 0.111 0.006
250-275R 275-300R 1.289 0.421 0.519 0.005 7.326 0.099
Note: Bold Denotes Significant Comparison
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households in the upper tiers are wealthy in comparison to Brazil’s poorest families they 
are by no means rich, and should perhaps be considered for inclusion in the program.
VII. Conclusion and Policy Implications
Child labor rates in Brazil remain high at 11.7% nationwide with rural children 
working at much higher rates than urban children, and males working more than females. 
The negative impact of child labor can be seen on both later literacy attainment and 
lagging school progress. Despite the assumption that only the children of the poor are 
working, the children of wealthier families in Brazil report some degree of labor market 
participation. However, the children of wealthier households start work at a later age, and 
are better compensated than the children of the poor.
Child labor rates appear to be correlated with state level concentration in certain 
industries. There is a positive correlation with agriculture and service industries, and a 
negative correlation with white-collar industries such as telecommunications. As 
expected, the correlation between child labor and family income levels is strongest at its 
lowest levels across all of Brazil. However, the level at which income changes may have 
the greatest impact on child labor participation rates in Brazil varies widely across states 
and regions.
Prior research has shown the current Brazilian child labor reduction program 
(PETI) to be highly effective in accomplishing its goals. With that in mind one policy 
implication of my results is that extending the program to cover families with slightly 
higher income levels could also reduce child labor.
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Table: B
Average Gradel lags for States of Brazil
State
Count 
Worker
Count 
Non-
Workers
Worker 
Gradelag
Non-
Worker 
Gradelag
Gradelag 
Diff
Amapá 10 242.00 3.40 0.54 2.86
São Paulo 710 8676.00 3.00 0.79 2.21
Rondônia 96 1131.00 2.73 0.72 2.01
Paraná 580 3839.00 2.33 0.69 1.63
Sergipe 170 1264.00 2.58 1.01 1.57
Paraíba 269 1713.00 2.54 1.01 1.52
Espírito Santo 227 1454.00 2.26 0.77 1.49
Roraima 28 373.00 2.39 0.92 1.47
Maranhão 516 1761.00 2.48 1.02 1.46
Mato Grosso 270 1598.00 2.16 0.71 1.46
Tocantins 287 1229.00 2.25 0.85 1.39
Alagoas 276 1347.00 2.51 1.12 1.39
Santa Catarina 291 1856.00 2.14 0.75 1.39
Rio de Janeiro 227 5099.00 2.33 0.95 1.39
Goiás 502 3311.00 2.06 0.71 1.35
Mato Grosso do Sul 197 1427.00 2.01 0.68 1.33
Rio Grande do Norte 184 1256.00 2.25 0.93 1.32
Rio Grande do Sul 758 5503.00 2.09 0.81 1.29
Piauí 339 1137.00 2.46 1.18 1.28
Amazonas 133 1974.00 2.14 0.95 1.19
Minas Gerais 994 7277.00 1.82 0.67 1.14
Pará 426 4245.00 2.09 1.01 1.08
Bahia 1338 7734.00 2.06 0.99 1.07
Distrito Federal 97 2320.00 1.82 0.82 1.00
Ceará 1014 5197.00 1.69 0.75 0.94
Pernambuco 740 5423.00 1.84 0.97 0.87
Acre 91 692.00 1.40 0.84 0.56
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Chart C:
Child Laborers by Region and State
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Chart D:
Urban and Rural Child Labor Rates
By State
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Chart E:
Childrens' Wages 
by Income Decile
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Table 
State Level Economic Concentration by 
Industry
Region Agg Fishing
Export 
Manufacturin
Heavy 
Manufacturin Utilitie Constuctio
Retail, 
and 
Service 
Activitie
Providing 
Food and 
Shelter
Telecom
unication Financial
Real 
Estate
Public 
Security 
and 
Defense Education
Health 
and 
Human 
Services
Rio de Janeiro 0.19% 0.01% 0.45% 11.21% 0.66% 3.77% 21.49% 5.43% 7.05% 2.55% 7.05% 16.94% 5.40% 4.22%
Distrito Federal 0.34% 0.00% 0.04% 2.51% 0.58% 3.45% 14.74% 3.44% 3.61% 3.00% 3.61% 43.05% 2.85% 5.09%
Amazonas 0.35% #N/A 0.31% 18.99% 0.64% 3.63% 17.34% 2.84% 6.21% 1.10% 6.21% 31.65% 3.15% 2.27%
Rondônia 0.42% 0.02% 0.31% 13.45% 0.87% 2.72% 25.89% 2.02% 3.45% 1.07% 3.45% 37.20% 2.06% 2.83%
Sergipe 0.62% 0.07% 0.55% 11.36% 0.86% 5.28% 17.12% 2.74% 3.55% 1.11% 3.55% 34.25% 4.48% 5.80%
Acre 0.90% 0.00% 0.05% 5.53% 0.00% 4.90% 19.05% 2.02% 3.66% 1.02% 3.66% 48.41% 2.77% 2.71%
Amapá 0.90% 0.01% 0.18% 3.72% 1.13% 4.51% 22.55% 2.36% 3.89% 4.56% 3.89% 37.53% 2.74% 1.52%
Rio Grande do Sul 0.91% 0.02% 0.27% 25.48% 0.64% 3.49% 25.41% 3.64% 5.13% 1.81% 5.13% 14.78% 2.98% 3.99%
Piauí 1.05% 0.16% 0.13% 8.39% 1.14% 4.19% 22.67% 1.96% 3.21% 1.31% 3.21% 39.24% 4.41% 3.12%
São Paulo 1.27% 0.01% 0.18% 21.85% 0.60% 3.64% 22.73% 4.18% 5.56% 2.74% 5.56% 12.96% 3.33% 3.73%
Brasil 1.31% 0.04% 0.39% 18.26% 0.69% 3.97% 22.94% 3.88% 5.22% 2.06% 5.22% 19.10% 3.65% 3.68%
Ceará 1.33% 0.19% 0.26% 18.41% 0.48% 4.47% 21.24% 2.93% 3.64% 1.43% 3.64% 25.50% 4.05% 3.22%
Roraima 1.34% #N/A 0.08% 3.95% #N/A 4.42% 22.70% 2.51% 2.82% 0.84% 2.82% 45.16% 2.83% 2.42%
Goiás 1.39% 0.01% 0.46% 15.10% 0.95% 4.01% 25.87% 3.03% 4.40% 1.50% 4.40% 23.82% 3.75% 3.12%
Espírito Santo 1.40% 0.04% 1.68% 14.33% 0.72% 5.40% 25.24% 3.68% 6.37% 1.64% 6.37% 19.51% 3.34% 3.43%
Maranhão 1.41% 0.07% 0.19% 6.24% 1.08% 5.14% 21.68% 1.87% 4.38% 1.72% 4.38% 37.94% 3.76% 3.47%
Santa Catarina 1.51% 0.08% 0.41% 32.60% 0.79% 3.59% 22.47% 4.05% 4.77% 1.52% 4.77% 11.25% 2.98% 2.17%
Pará 1.55% 0.17% 0.63% 12.66% 0.87% 5.57% 20.36% 2.44% 4.93% 1.58% 4.93% 31.03% 3.46% 3.30%
Paraná 1.55% 0.01% 0.27% 20.98% 0.59% 3.57% 26.22% 3.88% 5.36% 1.82% 5.36% 14.65% 4.14% 3.41%
Minas Gerais 1.56% #N/A 0.96% 17.93% 0.89% 4.54% 25.07% 3.91% 5.28% 1.55% 5.28% 18.16% 3.34% 3.83%
Tocantins 1.62% 0.01% 0.35% 6.22% 1.32% 5.04% 23.51% 1.89% 2.76% 1.00% 2.76% 46.89% 2.37% 2.07%
Pernambuco 1.72% 0.08% 0.18% 14.75% 0.61% 4.91% 20.62% 3.57% 4.50% 1.39% 4.50% 24.41% 4.18% 3.87%
Paraíba 1.73% 0.13% 0.37% 11.85% 0.75% 4.36% 16.96% 1.86% 2.92% 1.05% 2.92% 40.34% 5.22% 3.05%
Bahia 2.05% 0.14% 0.49% 9.63% 0.65% 4.90% 23.73% 3.95% 4.97% 1.58% 4.97% 26.16% 3.54% 4.35%
Alagoas 2.76% 0.00% 0.17% 23.98% 0.76% 2.91% 17.44% 2.78% 3.05% 0.95% 3.05% 29.83% 4.35% 2.73%
Mato Grosso do Sul 3.10% 0.02% 0.26% 11.79% 0.68% 4.51% 26.14% 3.00% 4.08% 1.59% 4.08% 27.07% 3.05% 3.00%
Rio Grande do Norte 3.62% 0.43% 1.37% 12.83% 0.62% 3.90% 19.03% 3.30% 3.11% 1.11% 3.11% 33.35% 4.64% 3.32%
Mato Grosso 3.76% 0.02% 0.36% 17.64% 0.68% 3.67% 28.66% 3.02% 4.27% 1.57% 4.27% 17.88% 2.92% 3.15%
AVERAGE
S
1.5 0.1 0.4 14.0 0.7 4.2 22.1 3.1 4.4 1.7 4.4 28.9 3.6 3.3
VARIANCE
S
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0
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Table G:
Various Income Breakdowns: All Brazil
Income by 100R Income by Decile1 Income By Decile2
Coeff. Pr>Chisq Coeff. Pr>Chisq Coeff. Pr>Chisq
Intercept -12.4792 <.0001 -12.3397 <.0001 -12.445 <.0001
0-100R 0.5917 <.0001 ****** ****** ****** ******
100-200R 0.0489 0.1734 ****** ****** ****** ******
200-300R 0.1175 0.0006 ****** ****** ****** ******
300-400R -0.0403 0.244 ****** ****** ****** ******
400-500R -0.00767 0.8415 ****** ****** ****** ******
500-600R -0.0685 0.0959 ****** ****** ****** ******
600-700R -0.1064 0.0223 ****** ****** ****** ******
700-800R -0.0406 0.4206 ****** ****** ****** ******
800-900R -0.0521 0.3476 ****** ****** ****** ******
900-1000R -0.1154 0.0682 ****** ****** ****** ******
1st Decile ****** ****** 0.5286 <.0001 ****** ******
2nd Decile ****** ****** 0.00409 0.913 ****** ******
3rd Decile ****** ****** 0.1924 <.0001 ****** ******
4th Decile ****** ****** -0.0105 0.7749 ****** ******
5th Decile ****** ****** 0.046 0.2024 ****** ******
6th Decile ****** ****** 0.00346 0.9238 ****** ******
7th Decile ****** ****** -0.00331 0.928 ****** ******
8th Decile ****** ****** -0.0454 0.2278 ****** ******
9th Decile ****** ****** -0.0292 0.4444 ****** ******
1st Decile ****** ****** ****** ****** 0.411 <.0001
2nd Decile ****** ****** ****** ****** -0.108 0.0019
3rd Decile ****** ****** ****** ****** 0.0818 0.0132
4th Decile ****** ****** ****** ****** -0.1168 0.0007
5th Decile ****** ****** ****** ****** -0.0573 0.0929
Male 0.7736 <.0001 0.7781 <.0001 0.7722 <.0001
Age 0.5218 <.0001 0.52 <.0001 0.5257 <.0001
Age^2 -0.00341 0.0353 -0.00329 0.0425 -0.00359 0.0267
Urban -1.5271 <.0001 -1.5035 <.0001 -1.5306 <.0001
Both Parents in 
Household 0.0051 0.8736 0.0132 0.6805 -0.00611 0.8486
# Children in 
Household 0.1154 <.0001 0.1126 <.0001 0.116 <.0001
White -0.0833 0.0031 -0.0638 0.0238 -0.1052 0.0002
HIV Rate -0.00628 0.0126 -0.00629 0.0125 -0.00729 0.0037
Aggriculture 1.869 0.4592 1.5207 0.5472 1.6042 0.5253
Manufacturing 5.9617 <.0001 5.6517 <.0001 5.9244 <.0001
Retail, and 
Service 
Activities 10.6344 <.0001 10.4311 <.0001 10.79 <.0001
Telecommunicat
ions -6.1802 0.026 -6.9376 0.0126 -6.2229 0.025
Public Security 
and Defense 4.2895 <.0001 4.0683 <.0001 4.2615 <.0001
Education 4.7204 0.0599 4.0078 0.1115 4.9106 0.0501
Other Social Services10.8151 <.0001 10.6564 <.0001 10.6281 <.0001
Note1: Base level is the 10th Decile
Note2: Base level is the 6th-9th Decile
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